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1. Introduction
Why would a firm allow an employee to take valuable assets out of the building upon their
departure? In August 2004, three large financial advisory firms—Smith Barney, Merrill Lynch,
and UBS—entered into a private agreement, the Protocol for Broker Recruiting (protocol), that
allowed departing financial advisors to solicit their clients when moving to other protocol member
firms without fear of legal recourse.1 Over the next decade, over 1,500 firms joined this pact. In
doing so, they willingly transferred their property rights in a key asset to their employees by
effectively waiving preexisting non-solicitation clauses.
While patents and trademarks help to protect intellectual property rights for the firm, other
forms of tacit human capital, such as relationships with clients, do not permit codification or armslength exchange. Though individual advisors often view the clients they work with as “their”
clients, the legal reality is that they are clients of the financial advisory firm. This arrangement
presents a distinction without a difference until an advisor wants to leave their employer. Given
the inalienable nature of advisor-client relationships, firms may choose to protect this type of
human capital through contractual mechanisms such as non-compete and non-solicitation
agreements. While such agreements are generally found to deter employee exit, what effect they
have on employee effort is less understood. If advisors are restricted from taking their clients when
they leave a firm, then the client relationship is firm-specific human capital, and investment in the
relationship may be inefficiently low due to a holdup problem (Grossman and Hart, 1986). In our
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Following the convention in the academic literature (e.g., Egan, Matvos, and Seru 2017 and Dimmock, Gerken, and
Graham 2017), we will use the term “financial advisor” to refer to investment professionals registered with FINRA.
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 defines “broker” broadly as “any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others.” In the United States, all brokers must register with FINRA.

paper, we study a shock that reassigns the ownership of this relationship to better understand the
role of property rights and human capital investment.
Studying these issues empirically is challenging. Typically, whether a particular
investment in human capital is general or firm-specific is an immutable characteristic. In the
financial advisory industry, the advent of the protocol changed investments in client relationships
from firm-specific to general human capital investments for some but not all advisors. Thus,
advisors competing in the same geographic area at the same time have different specificity to their
client-relationship investments. Moreover, we even observe this change in property rights within
the same employee-employer relationship (job spell), allowing us to dismiss alternative
explanations such as advisors selecting into protocol firms following their inclusion.
To study this industry, we obtain data from BrokerCheck and the Investment Adviser
Public Disclosure (IAPD) database. These two databases allow us to track the career paths of 1.3
million unique advisors across more than 50,000 firms. The data give precise dates and branch
locations on when individuals are employed with member firms, achieve professional
advancement, receive customer disputes and other complaints of misconduct, and start new firms.
Moreover, a series of standardized industry licenses allows us to track employee investments in
human capital in a systematic manner. The data allow us to not only control for observable
characteristics, but to use high dimensional fixed effects to control for unobservable heterogeneity
across time, geography, firms, and individuals (and their interactions).Thus, we argue that the
introduction of the protocol makes an ideal context in which to study the effects of the assignment
of property rights on the development of human capital.
Consider the example of two advisors working in the Raleigh, North Carolina, area: one
works for UBS and one works for Edward Jones. Their offices are less than 400 feet away from

each other and face each other, overlooking the 3700 block of Glenwood Ave. Each is positioned
less than three miles from the prestigious Carolina Country Club, and they likely compete for the
same clients. In 2004, executives in UBS’s corporate offices in New York decided to join the
protocol, while executives in Edward Jones’s St. Louis office did not (and still had not by the end
of our sample period). We test how, at that moment, the exogenous (to the advisor) change in
property rights affects the UBS advisor’s behavior relative to that of the Edward Jones advisor.
Does the UBS advisor treat the client relationship differently now that he owns the asset? Does he
seek additional licensing or career certification or leave to join a competing firm? We can control
for observable characteristics (e.g., tenure in the industry) that may affect these choices, but given
that we know the branch location of these two advisors, we can also use geographic fixed effects
to control for unobservable heterogeneity in the Glenwood area of Raleigh that may influence
these choices. Further, because protocol membership changes over time,2 and thus the shock to
property rights is staggered, we can compare workers at different firms at the same time, the same
individual at different points in time, and even individuals at the same firm at the same time across
geographical regions.
We first document that participation in the protocol affects labor mobility among financial
advisors. Firms that join the protocol see turnover increase in their workforce, and the effect is
more pronounced among more experienced advisors. We also see that firms are more likely to
poach and be poached by other protocol firms, consistent with membership lowering the barriers
to transfer between member firms. On net, protocol firms experience a growth in the number of
employees, and these new hires tend to be more experienced. However, after joining the protocol,
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Morgan Stanley, which also has a branch in the same office complex on Glenwood Avenue, joined the protocol in
2006.

firms see an increase in the number of their existing advisors who decide to leave and start their
own firms.
We next examine the behavior of the individual advisor. After an advisor’s firm joins the
protocol, granting the advisor property rights in the client relationship, we observe that the advisor
takes better care of the asset, as evidenced by lower rates of customer disputes. Further, we find
that advisors invest in their own human capital by sitting for additional industry licenses that allow
them to shift their business from a short-term, commission-based approach to a long-term, feebased approach. We observe the actual exam scores for each advisor and find that employees
perform better on these exams when their employer is in the protocol, suggesting that inclusion
not only affects the extensive margin to invest in human capital, but the intensive margin as well.
Finally, we find that advisors are less likely to obtain the Series 24 principal’s license following
protocol inclusion. This license grants an employee the ability to act in a supervisory role within
the firm (approving new accounts, approving transactions, supervising branch employees, etc.), a
role that may be difficult to transfer across different firms in the industry. Thus, as labor mobility
improves, advisors appear to shift human capital investment to forms that are more easily
transferable within the industry.
In each of these tests, we control for confounding variation by examining within-advisor,
within-firm changes in these rates. We also address other time-varying explanations by controlling
for the specific licenses an advisor gains over time as well as controlling for county-year fixed
effects. These strategies allow us to rule out alternative explanations based on changes in business
lines, regulatory phenomena, or economic conditions. In some specification, we focus on withinjob-spell variation, which also rules out concerns about employee-employer matching.

We also examine the firm-level consequences associated with joining the protocol. We find
within-firm evidence that revenues, assets under management, and number of accounts increase
after joining the protocol; these increases remain even after accounting for the increase in number
of employees. Given these results, a natural question to ask is, why do all firms not join? Firms
may correctly fear that they will lose more human capital through employee exit than they will
gain from attracting new advisors and increased production from existing advisors.
Our paper is related to a growing literature on labor restrictions and investment.
Establishing a causal relationship between labor mobility and the actions of employees and firms
is challenging. A series of papers utilizes geographic differences in enforceability (and, in some
cases, time-series variation in enforceability due to judicial decisions) of post-employment
covenants not to compete as a source of variation in mobility. Gilson (1999) examines differences
between the enforceability of non-compete agreements in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts’ Route
128 (Boston’s technology corridor). He argues that the relative rise of Silicon Valley over Route
128 is partially explained by California’s unwillingness to enforce non-compete agreements,
leading to increased labor mobility in Silicon Valley and increased knowledge spillovers between
its firms. Garmaise (2011) finds that the use of non-compete contracts reduces labor mobility and
binds human capital to the firm, but that these contracts affect the managers’ incentives to invest
in their own human capital, thereby reducing the value of the human capital stock. Jeffers (2017)
also finds that the enforceability of non-compete contracts reduces labor mobility, but that
enforceability is associated with an increase in capital investment by the firm, suggesting that
reducing labor mobility may affect firms’ capital stocks if replacing human capital is costly.
Lavetti, Simon, and White (2017) show that by deterring the poaching of patients, non-compete
agreements at physician practices increase the rate of return to job tenure. They argue that the

evidence is consistent with non-compete agreements enabling practices to allocate patients to new
physicians through intra-firm patient referrals, reducing a form of investment holdup. Barnett and
Sichelman (2016) note that the enforceability of non-compete agreements is only one of many
tools that firms may use to restrict labor mobility. Even in California, a state that bans the
enforcement of non-competes, firms may use trade-secret litigation and deferred compensation to
reduce mobility.
In contrast with non-compete agreements that prohibit a former employee from competing
against a former employer for a specified amount of time, the non-solicitation agreements we
examine are more narrowly aimed at preventing an employee from soliciting his former
employer’s clients. Therefore, the protocol allows us to isolate the effect of the value of the client
relationship (which is subject to the non-solicitation agreement) from the employee’s ability to
work in the industry.
Our paper also contributes to the emerging literature on the financial advisory industry.
Existing studies generally document that advisors do little to aid clients and instead harm
performance by steering them toward high-fee products or the advisor’s own personal biases (see,
e.g., Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano, 2009; Chalmers and Reuter, 2015; Hackethal, Haliassos,
and Jappelli, 2012; Hoechle et al., 2017; Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar, 2012; Foerster et al.,
2017). Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2017) show that a significant percentage of advisors have disputes
with their clients and suggest that certain firms “specialize” in misconduct and cater to
unsophisticated consumers. Several papers examine other factors associated with dispute rates.
Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2017) show that advisors learn from their peers and that
misconduct is contagious among co-workers. Charoenwong, Kwan, and Umar (2017) show that
advisors’ behavior responds to regulator identity. In our paper, we document that advisors’

treatment of clients is related to the internal incentives created by the assignment of property rights
to the client relationship.
We also contribute to the literature on property rights, ownership, and boundaries of the
firm. Assignment of ownership can encourage asset-specific human capital investments by
reducing the threat of holdup (Williamson, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore,
1990). Simester and Wernerfelt (2005) use a data set describing ownership of productive assets in
the carpentry trade to evaluate several factors influencing the allocation of asset ownership
between an employer and its employees. They find that employees are generally more careful with
their own tools (the productive asset) than with the tools owned by the firm. Massa, Reuter, and
Zitzewitz (2010) show that mutual fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers (which,
they argue, gives the manager “ownership” of the fund’s record) against the cost associated with
the manager’s increased future bargaining power (in this context, moving to a hedge fund). In the
context of the trucking industry, Baker and Hubbard (2004) exploit the introduction of onboard
computers as a shock to non-contractable driver care (by making care observable) to examine its
effect on ownership. In our paper, we observe a shock to property rights and examine how
employees change their investments in general and firm-specific human capital in response.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the financial
advisory industry and the Protocol for Broker Recruiting. Section 3 reviews the data and variables.
In Section 4, we show how labor mobility changes around the protocol. In Section 5, we examine
how individual advisors react to the protocol. Section 6 documents firm-level outcomes around
the protocol. Section 7 concludes.

2. Empirical Setting

Over 643,000 individuals were registered with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) in 2016. They generated more than $98 billion in revenues and managed over $3.4 trillion
in assets.3 The industry affects the well-being of many households: Hung et al. (2008) report that
73 percent of individual investors use an advisor for investment decisions (outside of employersponsored retirement plans).
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) argue that financial advice is a trust-based service,
similar to medicine. Patients trust their doctors and do not want to go to a random doctor, even if
equally qualified; clients of financial advisors are similarly attached. Although the issues we
discuss apply more generally to all firms that provide trust-relationship services, we use the
financial advisory industry as our empirical setting. A key feature is that the advisory relationships
with clients cannot be completely codified or replicated such that the client relationship is
inalienable from the advisor.
The role of the advisor-client relationship is central to the revenue-generating process of
the advisory firm. Firms face the choice of hiring advisors that are new to the industry and investing
in them as they slowly build their books of business or hiring away from competitors experienced
advisors with established books. In an effort to quickly grow assets under management (and hence
revenues), a recruiting firm’s hope is that a recruited advisor’s clients will relocate to the new firm.
A 2013 report from Cerulli Associates finds that advisors indicate success in transferring over 90%
(71%) of their targeted assets (total assets) when changing firms.
In response to the recruitment of their employees, incumbent firms often seek temporary
restraining orders and sue departing advisors for breach of employment contract in the hope of
preventing solicitation of past clients. Though often laid out in employment agreements, ownership
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The numbers are based on X-17 FOCUS filings in 2013.

claims on the advisor-client relationships of departing advisors are subject to the enforceability of
the employment agreement in the court system. Thus, an important feature of this industry is the
widespread use of non-solicitation agreements. In contrast with non-compete agreements that
prohibit a former employee from competing against a former employer for a specified amount of
time, non-solicitation agreements are more narrowly aimed at preventing an employee from
soliciting his former employer’s clients. An example of a non-solicitation clause is given below:
I agree that for a period of one year following my termination, I will not solicit by mail, by
phone, by personal meeting, or by any other means, either directly or indirectly, any
Account whom I served or whose name became known to me during my employment at
[firm] in any office and in any capacity. . . . The only exception will be my family and
relatives.
Courts have generally ruled more favorably on enforcing non-solicitation agreements compared to
non-compete agreements, as non-solicitation agreements impose fewer limitations on an
employee’s right to work. While courts have found that non-compete agreements substantially
restrict an employee’s ability to seek other employment, non-solicitation agreements are usually
viewed by courts as imposing reasonable conditions since they allow the employee to continue
working in his area of expertise.

2.1. The Protocol for Broker Recruiting
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act, also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999, prohibits financial institutions from sharing a client’s private information with other
financial firms without the client’s consent. After the act’s passage, poaching firms could no longer
prepare account-transfer papers that included data on account and Social Security numbers in

advance of advisors’ transitions. During the transition period, departing advisors were often faced
with temporary restraining orders by their former firms, while both firms fought over whether the
clients were free to transition to the new firm. Such disputes, in which client relationships were
publicly treated as property, did not project the image of client focus that the financial advisory
firms tried to foster.
In response to rising litigation, to compete freely to recruit new advisors, and to enhance
incentives for existing advisors, on August 19, 2004, Citigroup Global Markets (Smith Barney),
UBS Financial Services, and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith entered into the Protocol for
Broker Recruiting to allow advisors to transfer from one protocol firm to another without fear of
legal recourse. The protocol allows departing advisors to take five pieces of client data: names,
addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and account titles. The full text of the protocol is
provided in the Appendix. The protocol has been subjected to legal challenges, and courts have
consistently held member firms to the terms of the protocol; however, a number of claims are
excepted from the protocol, including soliciting customers prior to resignation, retaining customer
records or information beyond what is permitted under the protocol, soliciting fellow employees
to resign from the old firm, breaching a partnership agreement, and collecting sums due under
promissory notes or training agreements. Importantly, protocol advisors moving to non-protocol
firms do not receive similar treatment.4

2.2. Advisor Transition under the Protocol
The client relationship is legally with the firm, not with the individual advisor. Therefore, under
the protocol, solicitation of an advisor’s clients by the new firm, before the advisor has left his
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For example, see Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Brian Wilder & Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, FINRA
Arbitration Number 11-03937.

current firm, is a breach of the employment agreement with the advisor’s current firm and can lead
to immediate termination. Typically, the advisor resigns in writing to the local branch manager
and delivers the resignation in person. The key elements of the resignation letter include the notice
of the decision to resign, the effective date (usually immediate), and, per the requirements of the
protocol, a copy of the exact client information and documentation that the advisor is taking to the
new firm (names, addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses, and account titles). Additionally,
the advisor must include a list of all the account numbers associated with the advisor’s client
accounts (which the advisor is not allowed to retain). While the protocol effectively overrides the
existing employment agreement’s non-solicitation terms, the rest of the employment agreement
still applies and must still be complied with. For example, upon exit, the advisor may be liable for
retention deals such as forgivable loans, which are common in the industry. Further, the protocol
generally only applies for clients that advisors generated themselves.
Transitioning advisors may not solicit their former clients until formally registering with
their new firms. Industry custom is for transitioning advisors to move on a Friday (preferably
before a three-day weekend) so that they have the entire weekend to attract their former clients
before their prior firms can react. In Figure 1, we document that advisors moving between firms
are more likely to transition on a Friday, and in unreported tests, we find evidence that the effect
is even stronger on Fridays before three-day weekends.
Though individual advisors and even small teams are allowed to depart under the protocol,
when a recruiting firm takes a large number of advisors and staff at once, it opens itself to claims
of “raiding”. While claims of raiding are contentious, raiding is not protected under the protocol,
as precise definitions are not provided.

2.3. Identification
Our empirical objective is to identify the effect of property rights and increased labor mobility on
financial advisors’ behavior and human capital investment. The central issue regarding causality
is that financial advisory firms may choose to enter the protocol; thus, financial advisors are not
randomly allocated into this treatment. As a result, a correlation between an individual’s protocol
status and their choice to invest in human capital could arise for a variety of reasons. For example,
inclusion in the protocol could enhance the advisor’s labor mobility and encourage the advisor to
invest more in his own human capital. Alternatively, higher-quality advisors might continuously
invest in their human capital, and if firms with large proportions of high-quality advisors join the
protocol, we could observe a correlation between protocol and human capital investment that does
not imply a causal relationship between the two.
A key advantage of our setting is that we observe the time-varying individual actions of
employees who are geographically dispersed. Moreover, different firms (and thus their employees)
enter the protocol at varied times during our sample period. We can interpret our estimates as
causal only if protocol membership is related to unobserved factors that affect advisor behavior.
We therefore rely on the richness of our data set to include a bevy of fixed effects along several
key dimensions to condition out potential confounding factors.
In our main results that examine the human capital investment decisions of advisors, we
include county-year fixed effects. By conditioning out time effects, we remove potentially
confounding variation due to time-varying, industry-wide changes such as those due to
technological changes like the growth of the internet or economic events like the financial crisis.
Further, by employing year and county interaction effects, we also control for time-varying
changes in the regulatory environment (subsuming state-level variation as well). These effects will

also control for differences in local labor market and economic conditions across time. Our setting
allows us to compare individuals (some of whom work for a protocol member and some of whom
do not) that work in the same location (county) at the same time and therefore face similar
economic incentives to invest in human capital.
The nature of our data also allows us to track advisors across time and firms. This permits
us to include firm effects that remove any time-invariant characteristics of the firm that employs
the advisor, such as differences in business models across firms. The individual advisor fixed effect
removes all time-invariant characteristics of the advisor, including their overall propensity to
invest in human capital or ability. It also controls for the effects of characteristics that are
essentially fixed at the time the individual begins working as an advisor, such as educational
background and gender.
We perform a test of the difference in average customer dispute growth rates across the
treatment and control groups during the pretreatment era. We find that these differences are both
statistically and economically insignificant (coefficient of 0.001; t-stat of 0.40), suggesting that
after including our host of controls, advisors that enter the protocol had parallel trends to those that
did not in the pretreatment period. As an additional check, in Figure 3, we plot a times series of
the coefficient estimate on interaction Protocol with years to treatment (firm entrance into the
protocol). Prior to protocol entrance, the estimated differences of future protocol advisors’
misconduct rates are statistically (and economically) indistinguishable from the control group.
After protocol entrance, the treated advisors show a significant drop in misconduct rates.
In several specifications, we include advisor-firm fixed effects. Our identification comes
from the time-series variation in individuals’ human capital investment and from their protocol
status while they are employed by a specific firm. There are 198,616 job spells (advisor-firm pairs)

in which Protocol varies during the employment spell. Including these spell fixed effects
conditions out any within-advisor variation in human capital due to match effects. Importantly, in
these tests, the effect of the protocol relies solely on those advisors that join a firm before the firm
enters the protocol and remain with the firm after the firm enters the agreement. Thus, we remove
any effects of sorting of employees based on contemporaneous protocol status. These effects
subsume the individual advisor and firm fixed effects.5
Finally, in addition to careful control of advisor and advisor-firm matching, in certain
specifications, we also attempt to exploit geographic differences in the enforcement of non-solicit
agreements as a source of intensive-margin variation in property rights. During our sample period,
courts in California, Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma tended to take a dimmer view of nonsolicit agreements. In these states, we expect any changes to advisor incentives to invest in human
capital to be more muted when compared to other states. Unlike many other professions,
geographic mobility may be limited for financial advisors, as clients often require face-to-face
meetings. An example of this preference is seen on FINRA’s BrokerCheck website that allows
investors to search for local financial advisors within a 5-, 15-, or 25-mile radius.

3. Data and Summary Stats
3.1. The Protocol for Broker Recruiting
We obtain data on signatories to the protocol from the website maintained by Carlile, Patchen, &
Murphy LLP.6 The website lists the firm’s legal name, contact person information, the date the
firm joined, and the date the firm withdrew (if any). Firms are listed if, at any point in time, they
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When using job-spell effects, all time-invariant covariates are not identified, but the estimates of the time-varying
covariates (such as protocol membership) are consistent. If there is just one observation per spell, then the singleton
observation must be dropped in order to calculate standard errors correctly (Correia 2015).
6
The Broker Protocol, http://www.thebrokerprotocol.com/.

were a signatory. We are able to match the legal names from FINRA Form BD and Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) Form ADV filings to obtain Central Registration Depository (CRD)
numbers for signatories. To match ambiguous cases, we use the individual registrations of contact
persons or firm phone numbers and e-mail domains. In Table 1, we report the names and dates of
the large firms that joined the protocol during our sample period. In Figure 2, we show the growth
of membership over time. When the founding members (UBS, Merrill Lynch, and Smith Barney)
joined in 2004, approximately 10% of the advisors in the industry became subject to the protocol.7
Other large firms, Wachovia and Raymond James, followed in 2006, and protocol coverage grew
steadily thereafter, reaching over 40% by the end of our sample. Several large and notable firms,
such as Edward Jones, Commonwealth Financial Network, and Goldman Sachs, have never joined.
While withdrawal is permitted and easy (requiring only a 10-day notice), fewer than 100
(predominantly small) firms withdrew from the protocol during the period we studied.

3.2. Financial Advisors
The data on financial advisors come from FINRA Form U4, which provides detailed information
on advisors’ characteristics, employment histories, and history of misconduct. In the United States,
all registered representatives (the legal term for what we call “financial advisors”) must be
registered with FINRA by their employer using Form U4. This form must be updated following
any material change in the advisor’s information (including change in employment or disclosure
of misconduct). FINRA and state regulators jointly operate the CRD, which serves as a repository
for Form U4 and related regulatory filings. The CRD assigns each advisor and firm a unique
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Stephens, Inc., a smaller firm based in Little Rock, Arkansas, also joined later in 2004.

identification number that remains constant over time, allowing us to carefully track employment
movements. FINRA shares much of this information with the public via its BrokerCheck website.
We built a data set of financial advisors from disclosures available through BrokerCheck.
We used these disclosures to create an annual panel data set that provides information about each
individual advisor over the period 1999–2016, including the advisor’s employer, the branch
location of the advisor’s employer, and information about customer complaints, regulatory actions,
and other types of misconduct.
In total, the data set contains 1.3 million financial advisors and over 50,000 firms. We also
obtained more detailed data from state regulators via a series of Freedom of Information Act
requests for a subset of advisors. We summarize key attributes of the data in Panel A of Table 2
for all advisors as of the final year of our sample. We report sample averages separately for
advisors employed by protocol and non-protocol firms and find our sample is generally similar to
that of Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2017). Advisors employed by protocol firms have more
experience, more professional licensing, and are more likely to have an incident of misconduct
over their (longer) careers.

3.3. Financial Advisory Firms
We obtained firm-level data through SEC Rule 17a-5, which requires that FINRA member firms
file an annual audited report. We obtained our sample of 62,045 firm-year observations from 2001
to 2014 through AuditAnalytics. The Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single
(FOCUS) report provides basic financial and operational information such as revenues, assets, and
liabilities. We also collected data on firms from Form ADV, which investment advisory firms file
with the SEC. We summarize attributes of these data in Panel B of Table 2 for all firms as of the

final year of our sample. At the end of our sample, protocol firms are much larger than nonprotocol firms in terms of number of employees, revenues, assets, and number of client accounts.
Protocol firms are also broader in the number of product lines that they provide and in the number
of states in which they are registered. While protocol firms are larger on average, the majority of
large firms (> 1,000 employees) in the sample are not protocol members.

4. The Protocol and Hiring Practices
In this section, we examine how labor mobility changes around inclusion in the protocol.
In Table 3, we document the effect of the protocol by observing within-firm and within-year hiring
practices around a firm’s decision to enter the protocol using the follow model:
𝑌{𝑓,𝑡} = 𝛼 + 𝛽{1}{𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙}{𝑓,𝑡−1} + 𝛾{𝑋}{𝑓,𝑡−1} + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛿𝑓 + 𝜖{𝑓,𝑡}
where Y includes poaching (hiring away an employee from a competitor), turnover (losing an
employee to competitor), poaching/turnover levels from/to protocol and non-protocol firms, and
turnover that results in the departing employee starting their own firm. Given that protocol
inclusion is most likely to affect the hiring of experienced advisors, in all models, we focus on
advisors with more than a year of industry experience.8 X includes the log number of employees
for the firm and the log of the average industry experience for the firm’s employees, while f
indicates a financial advisory firm and t indicates year. The unit of observation is a firm-year. We
cluster standard errors at the firm level and year level.
We begin by noting that firms with more employees unconditionally have a greater change
in employee headcount. These firms hire new employees more frequently, poach existing
employees away from competitors, and lose their own employees to competitors at a higher rate.

8

In unreported results, we find no significant differences in hiring rookie employees around protocol inclusion.

We find that the average experience of the firm’s employees plays a smaller role. Notably, as
firms’ workforces age, firms are more likely to have employees leave to start their own firms.
Turning to the role of joining the protocol, we find that protocol inclusion is related to the
hiring and departure of experienced advisors. We see in Table 3 that after joining the protocol,
firms are more likely to hire away advisors from competitors (Column 1) and lose advisors to
competitors (Column 4). Given that our data allow us to track what firm the advisor came from
and left for, in addition to those firms’ own inclusion in the protocol, we can separately measure
the effects for how much of the employee turnover occurs from protocol and non-protocol firms.
We find that after joining the protocol, firms poach 16.5 more advisors from protocol firms
(Column 2) and reduce their poaching from non-protocol firms by nearly eight employees per year
(Column 3). To put these figures in economic context, the average firm in our sample poaches 13.2
employees and loses 10.4 employees a year.9 We find similar results for firms losing existing
employees. After joining the protocol, firms lose 9.5 employees a year to protocol firms (Column
5) and reduce the number of employees lost to non-protocol firms by 11 employees per year.
Articles in the popular press speak to the unintended consequences of firms joining the
protocol.10 Specifically, valuable advisors may use the cover of the protocol to leave and start their
own firms. Departing employees can do this by creating a shell company that registers for the
protocol. These employees then depart their existing firms and join the shell company. Given that
both firms are enrolled in the protocol, departing employees that follow the rules of the protocol
are able to solicit their clients to join them at the new firm. In Column 7, we examine this form of
entrepreneurship. We combine the employment history data from the IAPD with the ownership
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We note that change in headcount from Columns 2 and 3 does not equal the change in headcount from Column 1
due to the fixed effects.
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Fisher Phillips, “RIAs Are Increasingly Reaping the Benefits of the Protocol for Broker Recruiting,” n.d.,
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6dc53276-1520-4869-8d71-424e77be8573.

data in Form ADV to examine whether protocol inclusion is related to employees departing to start
their own firms. We find that firms in the protocol experience an average loss of two employees
that start their own firms relative to average entrepreneurship rates for a given year. We discuss
what harm, if any, these losses cause for employers in Section 6.
While firm-level tests such as these should be interpreted carefully given that the choice to
join the protocol is endogenous to the firm, they suggest that protocol inclusion is related to
changes in firms’ employment practices. If human capital may be deployed more efficiently at
some firms than others, it is possible for a firm to gain by voluntarily entering into an agreement
that allows its employees to leave the firm more easily while at the same time reducing the costs
of poaching away employees from other firms. We find that following protocol inclusion, firms
experience an increased turnover in employees. Advisors are poached from and away to other
protocol firms at increasing rates relative to general employee turnover in a given year.
In the following section, we turn to the effect of the protocol on employees themselves.
We argue that protocol inclusion is a shock to property rights from the perspective of an individual
advisor. The three founding members of the protocol (UBS, Merrill Lynch, and Smith Barney),
for example, each employed an average of over 18,000 advisors in any given year during our
sample period. Thus, we assume it is unlikely that any given advisor had a meaningful effect on
the firm’s decision to join.

5. Advisor-Level Results
In our setting, inclusion in the protocol alters the ownership rights of client relationships by shifting
the nature of the human capital from more firm-specific to more general. While this change
increases the advisor’s value in the external labor market, what effect it has on the behavior of the

advisor and the incumbent firm is less clear. On the one hand, firms may join the protocol out of
hubris, believing they will be net winners in the labor market for talented advisors.11 All firms
cannot be net winners, however, and for some firms, inclusion in the protocol may expedite
advisors leaving for greener pastures. In this case, in the absence of other benefits, incumbent firms
could be made worse off as talented human capital leaves for their competitors or to start their own
firms. Interestingly, few firms choose to leave the protocol even if they are net losers of advisors
to other protocol firms. In the prior section, we documented one potential benefit—protocol firms
are more attractive to advisors than nonprotocol firms—so there may be a net inflow of talented
advisors to these firms.
In this section, we examine another channel by which protocol membership can benefit
firms. Advisors realize that additional human capital investments in growing and maintaining their
book of business are transferable in protocol firms should they decide to exit, and this could
increase their effort. In this case, incumbent firms could be made better off if, in addition to
poaching away advisors from competitor firms, they are able to earn additional rents from existing
advisors that increase human capital production, even if some fraction of these advisors eventually
depart. We study advisor behavior by examining how protocol inclusion affects their relationships
with their clients through examining customer disputes and investment in human capital.

5.1. Client Relationships
While clients are legally the property of the firm, the individual advisor is the de facto face of the
relationship. The advisor maintains the relationship beyond the provision of the financial advice

“Each firm is arrogant enough to think they are going to be the winner, so they agreed [to join the protocol],” said
securities lawyer Dennis Concilla of Carlile Patchen & Murphy LLP, the law firm that maintains the protocol. Quoted
in Megan Leonhardt, “Who Owns Your Clients?” WealthManagement.com, October 24, 2013.
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through face-to-face, telephone, and electronic communication. Georgarakos and Inderst (2014)
provide evidence that the household’s usage of advice is affected both by its own perception of its
financial capability and by the trust it puts in professional advice. Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny
(2015) argue that a key function of advisors is to convince households to trust the financial system
enough to participate in the market. Thus, the trust between advisor and client is important tacit
and inalienable human capital.
Inclusion in the protocol converts a client relationship that was firm-specific human capital
into general human capital. If financial advisors are allowed to keep their clients when they leave
a firm, then advisors have a greater incentive to take care of this relationship asset under the
protocol.
Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2017) document labor-market consequences for advisors
following incidents of misconduct and find evidence that firms “match on misconduct,” meaning
that firms with a history of misconduct are more likely to hire advisors with a history of
misconduct. They find that reprimanded advisors take longer to find a new position, losing income
during the period they are unemployed and incurring the cost to find a new job. Moreover, after
losing a job following misconduct, advisors typically end up at substantially smaller, lower-paying
firms. Thus, as engaging in misconduct is costly in the labor market, we expect that, all else equal,
an advisor has a greater incentive to avoid engaging in misconduct in response to an increase in
labor mobility such as that provided by the protocol. We therefore estimate a specification of the
form:
{𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡}{𝑖,𝑡} = 𝛽{1}{𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙}{𝑖,𝑡−1} + 𝛾{𝑋}{𝑖,𝑡−1} + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝐹 + 𝛿{𝑐,𝑡} + 𝜖{𝑖,𝑡}

where i indicates a financial advisor, F indicates a financial advisory firm, and {c,t} indicates
county-year pair. {𝑋}{𝑖,𝑡−1} contains time-varying advisor characteristics such as experiences and
licenses earned during an advisor’s career.
The firm fixed effect removes the time-invariant characteristics of the firm that employs
the advisor, which is especially important in this setting as Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2017) suggest
that some firms “specialize” in misconduct. Controlling for time-varying licensing ensures that
any relationship we observe is not due to a confounding shift in business model during entry into
the protocol; e.g., we document in the following subsection that protocol entry results in a move
to more fee-based investment advisory business.
We also estimate specifications of the form:
{𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡}{𝑖,𝑡}
= 𝛽{1}{𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙}{𝑖,𝑡−1} + 𝛽{1}{𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙 ×𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡}{𝑖,𝑡−1} + 𝛾{𝑋}{𝑖,𝑡−1} + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛿𝐹
+ 𝛿{𝑐,𝑡} + 𝜖{𝑖,𝑡}
and
{𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡}{𝑖,𝑡} = 𝛽{1}{𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑙}{𝑖,𝑡−1} + 𝛾{𝑋}{𝑖,𝑡−1} + 𝛿𝑗 + 𝛿{𝑐,𝑡} + 𝜖{𝑖,𝑡}
where Solicit equals one if the advisor works in California, Montana, North Dakota, or Oklahoma,
the states with courts that are less favorable toward nonsolicitation agreements. Note, the main
effect of Solicit is subsumed by the county-year effects. j indicates a job spell (individual-firm
pair). The job spell fixed effects control for any potential match-related effects and subsume the
individual and firm fixed effects.
In Table 4, we test how the assignment of property rights affects advisors’ incentives to
engage in misconduct. The unit of observation is an individual-year. Protocol is an indicator
variable equal to one once the financial advisory firm signs the protocol and zero otherwise. In

Columns one through three, misconduct is measured using customer disputes as in Dimmock,
Gerken, and Graham (2017). In Columns four through six, misconduct is measured using a broader
definition that also includes criminal charges, terminations, and civil and regulatory actions as in
Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2017). Standard errors are clustered by firm-year.
We find strong evidence that advisors take better care of relationships after their firms enter
the protocol. In Column 1, we find that customer disputes drop by 29 basis points when advisors
enter the protocol, which represents a 42% reduction relative to the baseline rate. Recall that the
specification contains advisor, firm, and year-county fixed effects, so the reduction is relative to
the advisor’s own treatment of customers before entry into the protocol, to advisors at the firm
before entry into the protocol, and to contemporaneous behavior by other advisors within the same
county. In Column 2, we interact Protocol with an indicator variable for being located in a state
with courts that are less favorable toward non-solicitation agreements. Since the enforcement of
non-solicitation agreements is likely to be less stringent in these states, we would expect a more
muted effect for advisors located in these states. Note, Protocol could still reduce the costs of
litigation for advisors in these states. Consistent with this reasoning, we find a positive (but
statistically insignificant) coefficient on the interaction of Protocol × Solicit, suggesting that the
effects are mitigated in California, Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma.
In Column 3, we again estimate the specification, but now include job spell (advisor-firm)
fixed effects to condition out any within-advisor variation in human capital due to match effects.
In these tests, the effect of Protocol is estimated solely on those advisors that join a firm before it
enters the protocol and remain with the firm after it enters the agreement, eliminating the effects
of sorting employees based on contemporaneous protocol status. We find that the coefficient on
Protocol is a statistically and economically significant –27 basis points. Even advisors that work

for the same firm before and after the firm joins the protocol experience a drop in customer dispute
rates when they have greater property rights in the customer relationship. In Columns 3 through 6,
we find similar results with the broader Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2017) measure. Of particular
interest, in Column 5, Protocol × Solicit is statistically significant. In sum, these analyses provide
support for the notion that advisors are more careful with an asset (client relationship) when they
have more property rights (ability to solicit these customers upon exiting a firm).

5.2. Human Capital Investment
The transfer of client ownership through the protocol affects the value of the external labor market
for the advisor. The ability to transfer existing clients, rather than starting a book of business over,
decreases the advisor’s cost to exit and increases the value of the advisor for firms looking to poach
talent. This result yields several testable implications with regard to the advisor’s investment in
human capital. We hypothesize that following their employer’s joining of the protocol, advisors
will increase their own human capital production in an effort to become more attractive to external
firms. Further, we expect these increases to be stronger with regard to general human capital, given
that it can be transferred within the industry, and weaker in regard to firm-specific capital that is
not perfectly transferable. Further, we expect these incentives to be weaker in states that do not
allow non-solicitation agreements.
We do not observe actual effort at the advisor level. We are unable to observe, for example,
how many additional meetings they take, how many additional hours they work, or the change in
the performance or size of their accounts. As such, we must use a proxy for human capital
investment that is observable at the advisor level and is standardized across firms and across
geographic region. We use FINRA’s qualification exams. FINRA administers a series of exams

authorizing individuals to, among other things, sell securities, become investment advisors, and
become principals (supervisors) in a firm. The exams are standardized across the industry and
administered at national testing centers.

5.3. Industry Licenses
We focus on two sets of exams in particular: the investment advisor exam (Series 65 or Series 66)
and the general securities principal exam (Series 24). We do this for two reasons. First, these exams
are commonly taken by experienced employees, allowing us to test how protocol inclusion shifts
existing employee behavior. Second, these exams allows us to separately test for general versus
firm-specific human capital production. The job profile of an investment advisor at UBS and
Merrill Lynch is similar, and thus the effort from attaining a Series 65 license can transfer easily
across the industry. This transfer of knowledge for a principal (Series 24) is less clear. Firms
typically have specific policies and procedures that they require their principals to learn and follow.
Further, firms may prefer to promote principals from within, as these employees are likely to be
more familiar with the firm’s culture, making their investment in supervisor capital less
transferable. Consistent with this conjecture, in unreported tests, we find that after controlling for
industry tenure, individual, time, and geographic effects, principals are less likely to move to a
new firm than non-principals are.
In Table 5, we follow an approach identical to that of Models 2, 3, and 4 but replace
misconduct with the employee’s decision to earn an investment advisor license (Columns 1-3) or
a principal’s license (Columns 4–6). We find strong evidence that employees increase human
capital after their firm enters the protocol. In Column 1, we find that the odds that an employee
becomes an investment advisor increase by 94 basis points after entering the protocol, which

represents a 27% increase relative to the baseline rate. As in Table 4, the specification contains
advisor, firm, and year-county fixed effects, so the increase is measured relative to the advisor’s
own treatment before entry into the protocol, to advisors at the firm before entry into the protocol,
and to contemporaneous behavior by other advisors within the same county. In Column 2, we
interact Protocol with an indicator variable for being located in a state with courts that are less
favorable toward non-solicitation agreements. While the coefficient on the protocol’s main effect
remains positive, we find a negative coefficient on the interaction of Protocol × Solicit, suggesting
that the effect is smaller in California, Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma.
In Column 3, we include job spell (advisor-firm) fixed effects to condition out any withinadvisor variation in human capital due to match effects. As in Table 4, the effect of Protocol here
is estimated solely on those advisors that join a firm before the firm enters the protocol and remain
with the firm after the firm enters the agreement, eliminating the effects of sorting of employees
based on contemporaneous protocol status. We find that the coefficient on Protocol is a statistically
and economically significant 76 basis points. Even among advisors that work for the same firm
before and after the firm joins the protocol, these employees are more likely to add an investment
advisory license.
In Columns 4–6, we turn to the effect of protocol inclusion on firm-specific human capital.
We find that after their firm enters the protocol, employees are less likely to earn a principal’s
license. In Column 4, we find that the odds that an employee becomes a principal decrease by 111
basis points after entering the protocol, which represents a 51% decrease relative to the baseline
rate. We find that this effect is dampened in states that are less favorable toward non-solicitation
agreements and that these results hold when we include job spell (advisor-firm) fixed effects to
condition out any within-advisor variation in human capital.

To summarize, we find that protocol inclusion not only affects the employee’s decision to
invest in human capital, it also shifts their decision in the type of capital they invest in. Following
their employer’s joining of the protocol, employees increase human capital that transfers more
easily within the industry and reduce their investment in firm-specific human capital.

5.3.1. Testing Scores
One further advantage of using industry licenses as a proxy for human capital investment is that
for the Series 65 and Series 66 exams, we can observe the advisors’ actual exam scores. This
observation allows us to test for changes in human capital on the intensive margin. For these
exams, we observe each time the employee sat for the exam, what score they received, and whether
or not they passed. In Table 6, we examine each advisor’s score on their initial attempt of the exam.
We control for the advisor’s industry experience, their other industry licenses, and firm and year
fixed effects. Our variable of interest is Protocol, which captures whether the advisor’s employer
was in the protocol at the time the exam was taken. In Columns 1 and 2, we test for scores on the
Series 66 exam, and in Columns 3 and 4, we test for scores on the Series 65 exam (we explain the
differences between the two tests below).
From Column 1, we find that advisors that are in the protocol score 1.08 points higher (out
of 100 possible points)on their Series 66 exam. Conversations with several advisors indicate that
outright score may not be a meaningful measure of effort. Conditional on passing the exam,
employers do not reward advisors for scoring higher. As such, in Column 2, we use a linear
probability model to test whether protocol inclusion is associated with a higher pass rate for
advisors. We find that advisors in the protocol are 5.05% more likely to pass Series 66, a
meaningful increase given that the baseline pass rate of the exam is 71%.

The use of the Series 66 exam is relatively new to the industry. The goal of its introduction
was to combine the investment advisor’s exam (Series 65) with the securities agent state law exam
(Series 63). As the Series 63 is required to begin practice in most states, the Series 66 effectively
serves as an investment advisor’s exam for employees that are new to the industry.12 The Series
65 exam was the original investment advisory exam for the industry. The exam is typically taken
by experienced brokers that already hold their Series 63 license and are looking to change their
business model from a commission-based, transactional one to a long-term, fee-based one. In our
data, the median industry experience of candidates sitting for the Series 66 and Series 65 exams is
one year and seven years, respectively. As such, performance on the Series 65 exam allows us to
test for changes in human capital on the intensive margin for experienced brokers.
Turning to Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, we find that test performance on the Series 65
exam is higher for brokers that work for firms in the protocol. An experienced broker that sits for
the Series 65 exam is 3.33% more likely to pass the exam if his employer is in the protocol. The
baseline pass rate in our data is 72.5%. In sum, we find that protocol inclusion affects an advisor’s
investment in human capital. Advisors are more likely to shift their investment away from firmspecific human capital that is difficult to transfer within the industry and toward general human
capital that is easily transferred among firms. These effects are found at both the extensive and
intensive margins.

6. Firm Outcomes
In this section, we examine the firm-level consequences for firms joining the protocol. One
implication of using firm-level analysis is that our identification is not as clean as in the individual
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level tests, and the estimates should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. If firms that join the
protocol experience improved performance after membership, a natural question to ask is, why do
not all firms choose to join? One possibility is that a firm may fear it will lose more human capital
through the exit of its current advisors than it will gain from attracting new advisors. This
possibility is highlighted by the case of Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Stanton: “Where both parties are
signatories, they have essentially agreed to reciprocal poaching of registered representatives and
the registered representative’s clients from the former firm, apparently on the assumption that they
will gain as much as they lose in the exchange.” However, as we document earlier, the protocol is
not necessarily a zero-sum game. While the loss of every advisor that leaves one protocol firm for
another is exactly offset by the gain at the poaching firm, the allocation of property rights
encourages advisor effort, and therefore protocol firms as a whole can be better off even if they
have no net gain through movement of advisors within the protocol. A related point is that protocol
membership can make these firms more attractive to nonprotocol advisors, so that membership
increases the ability to recruit high-quality advisors.
We examine the question of whether firm performance improves after firms become
protocol members. We use firm-level data from X-17 FOCUS reports (which report revenues and
assets only of the filing subsidiary) and Form ADV (which reports assets under management and
number of accounts for the entire investment advisory firm). We again estimate a specification
following equation (1), now where Y are various firm-level measures of output, F indicates a
financial advisory firm, and t indicates year. As inclusion in the protocol has a strong effect on
employee recruiting, we estimate this specification both with and without including the logarithm
of number of employees in {𝑋}{𝑖,𝑡−1} to examine both absolute changes and changes controlling
for the growth of employees.

Table 7 reports regression results from these analyses. In all specifications, we include both
firm and year fixed effects. The firm effects help control for any time-invariant reporting
differences between firms. In Panel A, we do not control for the number of employees, so the
results should be interpreted in light of this. We find evidence that firms experience significantly
higher revenues after joining the protocol. We similarly find evidence that assets under
management and number of client accounts increase after protocol membership. In Panel B, we
control for the number of employees to tease apart the growth due to increased head count and
other factors (like increased productivity). In these specifications, we find that revenues increased
by 6% (though the coefficient is not statistically significant), assets under management increased
by 29.7%, and accounts increased by 46.6% after protocol membership.13 We interpret these
finding as consistent with protocol membership enhancing individual advisor performance.

7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have evaluated a firm’s decision to voluntarily increase an employee’s claim on
his or her human capital, transforming investment in client relationships from a firm-specific to a
general asset. In doing so, the firm’s choice to join the protocol increases the employee’s labor
mobility. While inclusion in the protocol hastens employee departure from the firm, it also
increases the employees’ investment in their human capital. We find that advisors at protocol firms
take better care of their client relationships, as evidenced by a drop in customer dispute rates upon
their employer’s joining the protocol. Advisors also increase their number of industry licenses and
shift their business from a shorter-term, commission-based model to a longer-term, fee-based
model. Our ability to utilize job spell, time, and geography fixed effects allows us to rule out
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alternative conclusions such as selection bias and local economic effects. Combining the effects
of increased effort from existing employees and firms’ ability to poach talent from competing
firms, we find that upon joining the protocol, firms increase assets under management and the
number of accounts they handle. Our findings provide empirical support for property rights-based
investment theories of human capital.

Appendix: Official Text of the Protocol for Broker Recruiting
The principal goal of the following protocol is to further the clients’ interests of privacy and
freedom of choice in connection with the movement of their Registered Representatives (“RRs”)
between firms. If departing RRs and their new firm follow this protocol, neither the departing RR
nor the firm that he or she joins would have any monetary or other liability to the firm that the RR
left by reason of the RR taking the information identified below or the solicitation of the clients
serviced by the RR at his or her prior firm, provided, however, that this protocol does not bar or
otherwise affect the ability of the prior firm to bring an action against the new firm for “raiding.”
The signatories to this protocol agree to implement and adhere to it in good faith.
When RRs move from one firm to another and both firms are signatories to this protocol,
they may take only the following account information: client name, address, phone number, email
address, and account title of the clients that they serviced while at the firm (“the Client
Information”) and are prohibited from taking any other documents or information. Resignations
will be in writing delivered to local branch management and shall include a copy of the Client
Information that the RR is taking with him or her. The RR list delivered to the branch also shall
include the account numbers for the clients serviced by the RR. The local branch management will
send the information to the firm’s back office. In the event that the firm does not agree with the
RR’s list of clients, the RR will nonetheless be deemed in compliance with this protocol so long
as the RR exercised good faith in assembling the list and substantially complied with the
requirement that only Client Information related to clients he or she serviced while at the firm be
taken with him or her.
To ensure compliance with GLB and SEC Regulation S-P, the new firm will limit the use
of the Client Information to the solicitation by the RR of his or her former clients and will not

permit the use of the Client Information by any other RR or for any other purpose. If a former
client indicates to the new firm that he/she would like the prior firm to provide account number(s)
and/or account information to the new firm, the former client will be asked to sign a standardized
form authorizing the release of the account number(s) and/or account information to the new firm
before any such account number(s) or account information are provided.
The prior firm will forward to the new firm the client’s account number(s) and/or most
recent account statement(s) or information concerning the account’s current positions within one
business day, if possible, but, in any event, within two business days, of its receipt of the signed
authorization. This information will be transmitted electronically or by fax, and the requests will
be processed by the central back office rather than the branch where the RR was employed. A
client who wants to transfer his/her account need only sign an Automated Customer Account
Transfer (ACAT) form.
RRs that comply with this protocol would be free to solicit customers that they serviced
while at their former firms, but only after they have joined their new firms. A firm would continue
to be free to enforce whatever contractual, statutory or common law restrictions exist on the
solicitation of customers to move their accounts by a departing RR before he or she has left the
firm.
The RR’s former firm is required to preserve the documents associated with each account
as required by SEC regulations or firm record retention requirements.
It shall not be a violation of this protocol for an RR, prior to his or her resignation, to
provide another firm with information related to the RR’s business, other than account statements,
so long as that information does not reveal client identity.

Accounts subject to a services agreement for stock benefits management services between
the firm and the company sponsoring the stock benefit plan that the account holder participates in
(such as with stock option programs) would still be subject to (a) the provisions of that agreement
as well as to (b) the provisions of any account servicing agreement between the RR and the firm.
Also, accounts subject to a participation agreement in connection with prospecting individual
retirement account (IRA) rollover business would still be subject to the provisions of that
agreement.
If an RR is a member of a team or partnership, and where the entire team/partnership does
not move together to another firm, the terms of the team/partnership agreement will govern for
which clients the departing team members or partners may take Client Information and which
clients the departing team members or partners can solicit. In no event, however, shall a
team/partnership agreement be construed or enforced to preclude an RR from taking the Client
Information for those clients whom he or she introduced to the team or partnership or from
soliciting such clients.
In the absence of a team or partnership written agreement on this point, the following terms
shall govern where the entire team is not moving: (1) If the departing team member or partner has
been a member of the team or partnership in a producing capacity for four years or more, the
departing team member or partner may take the Client Information for all clients serviced by the
team or partnership and may solicit those clients to move their accounts to the new firm without
fear of litigation from the RR’s former firm with respect to such information and solicitations; (2)
If the departing team member or partner has been a member of the team or partnership in a
producing capacity for less than four years, the departing team member or partner will be free from

litigation from the RR’s former firm with respect to client solicitations and the Client Information
only for those clients that he or she introduced to the team or partnership.
If accounts serviced by the departing RR were transferred to the departing RR pursuant to
a retirement program that pays a retiring RR trailing commissions on the accounts in return for
certain assistance provided by the retiring RR prior to his or her retirement in transitioning the
accounts to the departing RR, the departing RR’s ability to take Client Information related to those
accounts and the departing RR’s right to solicit those accounts shall be governed by the terms of
the contract between the retiring RR, the departing RR, and the firm with which both were
affiliated.
A signatory to this protocol may withdraw from the protocol at any time and shall endeavor
to provide 10 days’ prior written notice of its withdrawal to all other signatories hereto. A signatory
who has withdrawn from the protocol shall cease to be bound by the protocol and the protocol
shall be of no further force or effect with respect to the signatory. The protocol will remain in full
force and effect with respect to those signatories who have not withdrawn.
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Table 1
Signatories of the Broker Protocol
This table reports the name and signatory date of large financial advisory firms (> 1, 000 employees)
entering the Protocol during our sample period.
Firm Name
UBS Financial Services Inc.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Smith Barney
Wachovia Securities LLC
Wells Fargo Advisors LLC
Raymond James & Associates Inc.
Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc.
Jefferies & Company Inc.
A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc.
Cambridge Investment Research Inc.
Purshe Kaplan Sterling Investments Inc.
Credit Suisse Securities USA LLC
RBC Capital Markets Corp.
Stifel Nicolaus & Company Inc.
LPL Financial Corp.
Janney Montgomery Scott LLC
National Planning Corp.
Oppenheimer & Co. Inc.
Next Financial Group Inc.
Morgan Keegan & Company Inc.
Tower Square Securities Inc.
Walnut Street Securities Inc.
NFP Advisor Services LLC

Date
18-Aug-04
18-Aug-04
18-Aug-04
10-Jan-06
10-Jan-06
31-Jul-06
6-Oct-06
15-Feb-07
1-Mar-07
2-Mar-07
9-Mar-07
20-Nov-07
1-Jul-08
7-Aug-08
4-Sep-08
7-Nov-08
25-Nov-08
12-Feb-09
9-Mar-09
16-Mar-09
27-Mar-09
27-Mar-09
2-Apr-09
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Firm Name
Woodbury Financial Services Inc.
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC
FSC Securities Corp.
Royal Alliance Associates Inc.
SagePoint Financial Inc.
Ameriprise Financial Services Inc.
Lincoln Financial Securities Corp.
Waddell & Reed Inc.
Transamerica Financial Advisors Inc.
Ameritas Investment Corp.
U.S. Bancorp Investments Inc.
Robert W. Baird & Co.
Securities America Inc.
JP Morgan Securities LLC
Park Avenue Securities LLC
Hornor, Townsend & Kent Inc.
SunTrust Investment Services Inc.
MetLife Securities Inc. MSI
Financial Network Investment Corp.
Cetera Advisors LLC
Multi-Financial Securities Corp.
First Allied Securities Inc.
ProEquities Inc.

Date
7-Apr-09
1-Jun-09
5-Jun-09
5-Jun-09
5-Jun-09
11-Jun-09
31-Aug-09
12-Mar-10
1-Dec-10
14-Dec-11
6-Feb-12
2-Apr-12
28-Dec-12
6-Feb-14
7-Aug-14
31-Oct-14
19-Nov-14
7-Jan-15
11-Jan-16
11-Jan-16
11-Jan-16
11-Jan-16
30-Nov-16

Table 2
Summary Statistics
This table summarizes individual financial advisor and financial advisory firm-level data for
observations in the final year of the sample. In Panel A, individual data is obtained from
FINRA’s BrokerCheck and is reported as of the last year of the sample. Experience is defined
as number of years since entry into the industry. Customer Disputes and Total Misconduct
(including criminal charges, terminations, civil and regulatory actions) are calculated from
the BrokerCheck disclosures. Standard errors are clustered by firm-year. We report sample
means for Protocol and Non-Protocol advisors, and the difference. In Panel B, firm-level
data are supplemented with data from Form BD (number of business lines and states of
registration), FOCUS X-17 reports (revenues), and Form ADV (AUM and accounts) and
is reported as of the last year of the sample. We report sample means for Protocol and
Non-Protocol advisors, and their differences. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Individual-Level Summary Statistics
Protocol Non-Protocol
# of Firms in Career
2.3
1.9
Experience
16.4
13.6
Customer Dispute
7.0%
2.5%
Total Misconduct
10.1%
5.9%
Series 6
26.2%
44.2%
Series 7
81.0%
61.6%
Series 63
70.7%
74.8%
Series 65
27.7%
13.9%
Series 66
31.9%
19.9%
Series 24
13.9%
14.8%

Difference
0.4
2.8
4.5%
4.2%
-18.0%
19.5%
-4.1%
13.8%
12.0%
-0.9%

Panel B: Firm-Level Summary Statistics
Protocol Non-Protocol
# Employees
1,213.6
100.1
Number of business lines
13.4
5.8
Number of states registered
39.1
14.3
AUM (millions)
$23,072
$3,016
# Accounts
88,617.2
6,994.2
Revenues (millions)
$245
$13
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***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

Difference
1,113.5
***
7.6
***
24.8
***
$20,056
***
81,622.9 ***
$ 232
***

Table 3
Brokerage Firm Employment and Turnover from Joining the Protocol
We model financial advisory firms’ change in employee headcount of experienced employees (>1 year industry experience) as a
function of entering the Protocol. The unit of observation is a firm-year. Poaching (Departing) is a count variable of hiring (losing)
experienced brokers. In columns 2 (5) and 3 (6), we separately estimate whether the poaching (departing) occurs from (for) a
Protocol or Non-Protocol firm. In Model 7, we estimate how many of the departing employees leave to start their own firms.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year levels. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Protocol
Log # Employees
Log Experience
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared

1
Poaching

2
Poaching from BP

3
Poaching from non-BP

4
Departing

5
Departing to BP

6
Departing to non-BP

7
Start Own Firm

13.849**
[2.22]
8.498***
[6.57]
-0.361
[-0.51]

16.511***
[5.03]
1.206***
[4.27]
-0.236
[-1.36]

-7.906***
[-3.10]
4.573***
[6.56]
0.313
[1.15]

9.290*
[1.82]
10.405***
[6.40]
0.186
[0.27]

9.480**
[2.58]
1.535***
[3.64]
-0.313
[-1.09]

-10.915***
[-3.20]
7.801***
[6.50]
1.007**
[2.29]

2.165*
[1.82]
0.618***
[5.00]
0.174***
[4.02]

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

77,341
0.836

77,341
0.667

77,341
0.801

77,341
0.664

77,341
0.609

77,341
0.524

77,341
0.831

Table 4
Client Relationships: Customer Disputes and Misconduct
We test how the assignment of property rights affects advisors’ incentives to protect client relationships and avoid misconduct. The unit of observation is an individual-year. Protocol is an
indicator variable equal to one once the advisory firm signs the Protocol and zero otherwise. Solicit
equals one in states with courts that are less favorable to non-solicit agreements: California, North
Dakota, Montana, and Oklahoma. In Columns 1 through 3, the dependent variable is an indicator
for customer disputes in a given advisor-year. In Columns 4 through 6, the dependent variable is
misconduct which includes criminal charges, terminations, civil and regulatory actions in addition
to customer disputes. Standard errors are clustered by firm-year. ***,**, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Protocol

1
-0.0029***
[-2.880]

Protocol × Solicit
Log Experience
Series 63
Series 6
Series 7
Other Exams
Series 24
Investment Adviser (IA)
Employee FE
Firm FE
Firm × Employee FE
Year × FIPS FE
Observations
R-squared

0.0076***
[19.273]
-0.0011***
[-5.641]
-0.0039***
[-11.219]
0.0015***
[5.598]
-0.0006***
[-4.002]
0.0000
[0.147]
0.0028***
[8.641]
Y
Y
Y
9,234,609
0.146

2
-0.0030***
[-3.042]
0.0008
[1.193]
0.0076***
[19.273]
-0.0011***
[-5.641]
-0.0039***
[-11.219]
0.0014***
[5.590]
-0.0006***
[-3.999]
0.0000
[0.146]
0.0028***
[8.643]
Y
Y
Y
9,234,609
0.146
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3
-0.0027**
[-2.306]

4
-0.0028***
[-2.736]

0.0057***
[13.010]
-0.0009***
[-3.828]
-0.0025***
[-6.525]
0.0016***
[4.984]
-0.0007***
[-3.215]
-0.0001
[-0.365]
0.0024***
[5.833]
subsumed
subsumed
Y
Y
8,819,308
0.239

0.0097***
[21.227]
-0.0015***
[-6.443]
-0.0040***
[-7.314]
0.0009***
[3.174]
-0.0007***
[-4.220]
-0.0005
[-1.569]
0.0032***
[9.419]
Y
Y
Y
9,234,609
0.165

5
-0.0030***
[-3.025]
0.0019**
[2.431]
0.0097***
[21.233]
-0.0015***
[-6.443]
-0.0040***
[-7.314]
0.0009***
[3.156]
-0.0007***
[-4.214]
-0.0005
[-1.571]
0.0032***
[9.425]
Y
Y
Y
9,234,609
0.165

6
-0.0024*
[-1.936]

0.0077***
[14.736]
-0.0011***
[-3.685]
-0.0025***
[-3.666]
0.0017***
[4.542]
-0.0009***
[-4.091]
-0.0008**
[-2.422]
0.0029***
[6.583]
subsumed
subsumed
Y
Y
8,819,308
0.256

Table 5
Advisor Propensity to Invest in Human Capital
We model an individual advisor’s decision to add an additional license/certification. The unit of
observation is an employee-year. Protocol is an indicator variable equal to one once the advisory firm
signs the Protocol and zero otherwise. Solicit equals one in states with courts that are less favorable
to non-solicit agreements: California, North Dakota, Montana, and Oklahoma, and zero otherwise.
In Columns 1 through 3, the dependent variable is an indicator for obtaining an investment advisor
(Series 65 or Series 66) license. In Columns 4 through 6, the dependent variable is an indicator for
obtaining a Principal (Series 24) license. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year level. ***,**,
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

1
IA
Protocol

2
Industry Specific
IA

0.0094***
[3.088]

Protocol × Solicit
Log Experience
Series 63
Series 6
Series 7
Other Exams
Series 24

0.0126***
[6.577]
-0.0336***
[-18.433]
0.0356***
[12.131]
0.1572***
[44.826]
0.0193***
[21.223]
0.0200***
[14.667]

0.0099***
[3.224]
-0.0041**
[-2.343]
0.0126***
[6.575]
-0.0336***
[-18.437]
0.0357***
[12.135]
0.1572***
[44.830]
0.0193***
[21.226]
0.0200***
[14.670]

3
IA

Observations
R-squared

5
6
Firm Specific
Series 24
Series 24
Series 24

0.0076**
[2.279]

-0.0111***
[-5.941]

0.0196***
[7.654]
-0.0290***
[-16.236]
0.0195***
[5.629]
0.1232***
[33.022]
0.0121***
[10.633]
0.0155***
[8.751]

Investment Adviser (IA)
Employee FE
Firm FE
Firm × Employee FE
Year × FIPS FE

4

-0.0015*
[-1.780]
-0.0030***
[-3.044]
-0.0135***
[-12.654]
0.0520***
[28.636]
0.0340***
[28.622]

-0.0113***
[-6.187]
0.0020*
[1.682]
-0.0015*
[-1.779]
-0.0030***
[-3.044]
-0.0135***
[-12.657]
0.0520***
[28.639]
0.0340***
[28.620]

-0.0081***
[-4.589]

0.0021**
[2.048]
-0.0054***
[-5.338]
-0.0079***
[-6.950]
0.0495***
[25.363]
0.0218***
[20.301]

0.0024***
[2.641]

0.0024***
[2.642]

-0.0013
[-1.343]

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

subsumed
subsumed
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

subsumed
subsumed
Y
Y

8,861,782
0.872

8,861,782
0.872

8,454,636
0.924

8,861,782
0.864

8,861,782
0.864

8,454,636
0.922

45

Table 6
FINRA License Test Scores
We test how the assignment of property rights affects advisors’ incentives to invest in their
human capital. Here, we measure human capital through advisors’ exam scores on the Series
65 and Series 66 exams. The unit of observation is an exam (individual-year). Standard
errors are clustered at the firm-year level. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectivesly.
1

2
Series 66
Score
Pass = 1
Protocol
Log Experience
Series 6
Series 7
Series 24
Other Exams
Firm FE
Time FE
Observations
R-squared

3

4
Series 65
Score
Pass = 1

1.0790***
[4.437]
-0.0852
[-0.658]
0.1376
[1.170]
-0.7268***
[-3.850]
1.9490***
[12.104]
0.5951***
[7.065]

0.0505***
[3.989]
-0.0025
[-0.349]
0.0061
[0.858]
-0.0324***
[-3.079]
0.0976***
[10.625]
0.0224***
[4.780]

0.4810
[1.235]
0.8539***
[8.102]
-0.0125
[-0.097]
2.0683***
[13.003]
1.3426***
[8.437]
0.7778***
[11.018]

0.0333**
[2.002]
0.0374***
[7.459]
0.0161**
[2.244]
0.0981***
[11.748]
0.0547***
[6.565]
0.0348***
[9.293]

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

35,171
0.082

35,171
0.059

33,373
0.151

33,373
0.108
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Table 7
Advisory Firm Effects from Joining The Protocol
We model the effect on financial advisory firms’ operations following their decision to join
the Protocol. Protocol is an indicator variable equal to one once the advisory firm signs the
Protocol and zero otherwise. In Column 1, the dependent variable is the revenues reported
on the firm’s FOCUS filing. In Column 2, the dependent variable is the logarithm of assets
under management reported on the firm’s Form ADV filing. In Column 3, the dependent
variable is the logarithm of number of client accounts reported on the firm’s Form ADV filing.
The unit of observation is a firm-year. Standard errors are clustered at firm and year level.
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Baseline
Protocol
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared

log(Revenue)
0.508***
[3.87]
Y
Y
32,472
0.770

log(AUM)
0.378***
[4.06]
Y
Y
6,815
0.866

log(Accounts)
0.520***
[4.76]
Y
Y
6,816
0.875

log(Revenue)
0.109
[1.07]
1.002***
[28.22]
Y
Y
32,472
0.792

log(AUM)
0.304***
[3.43]
0.374***
[6.83]
Y
Y
6,815
0.871

log(Accounts)
0.438***
[4.13]
0.412***
[6.60]
Y
Y
6,816
0.880

Panel B: With number of employee controls
Protocol
log(employees)
Firm FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared
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